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FEATURE ARTICLE 
THE RECENT BEHAVIOUR OF AGGREGATE CONSUMER SPENDING 
by Alan Carruth and Andrew Henley, University of Kent at Canterbury 
Introduction 
The modelling and forecasting of consumer 
behaviour has in the last few years taxed 
economists considerably. By the middle of the 
boom of the late 1980s it was becoming apparent to 
most forecasters that their popular models of UK 
consumer behaviour were failing to forecast the 
extent of the sizeable growth in real consumer 
spending at the time. Personal sector savings rates 
reached post-war low levels and by 1988 real 
consumer spending growth reached 7 per cent per 
annum. Since that time we have witnessed a quite 
spectacular collapse in consumer spending and in 
confidence, to the extent that savings rates have 
been restored quite rapidly. During the latter half of 
Nigel Lawson's chancellorship policy failed to 
recognise the inflationary consequences of the 
relaxed monetary stance which followed the 1987 
stock market crash and the considerable fiscal 
stimulus afforded by the cuts in higher and basic 
rate income tax. The underforecasts of consumer 
spending growth produced by agencies such as the 
UK Treasury and the Bank of England, and other 
independent forecasters, in part, contributed to this 
failure. 
One consequence of this is that there is occurring, 
within the economics profession, a substantial 
reappraisal of existing forecasting methodology (for 
instance the "7 Wise Men" are now advising the 
Chancellor, based on the forecasting views of their 
respective agencies). The key element of any model 
of the UK personal sector is a consumption function 
specification. Initially, this reappraisal took the form 
of the incorporation of additional explanatory 
variables into consumption functions, in particular 
attempting to capture the effects of progressive 
financial deregulation in the 1980s and the 
importance of the housing market on spending 
patterns. Latterly modellers have begun to take on 
board the emphasis in the American literature on 
the extent to which consumer behaviour is 
"forward-looking". One further feature of consumer 
behaviour in Britain which has emerged in the 
1980s, which is particularly important, is that it 
exhibits considerable regional variation. The 
consumer boom of the mid 1980s was 
predominantly a south-eastern phenomenon. The 
North and Scotland were not affected to anything 
like the same extent. 
The Failure to Forecast the 1980s Spending 
Boom 
There is little doubt that the boom in consumer 
spending which occurred between 1985 and 1988 
was encouraged by falling interest rates, strong 
growth in the economy and optimism about the 
future (optimism which with the benefit of 
hindsight was very misplaced). One consequence of 
the boom was that it is likely to have contributed 
significandy to the structural balance of payments 
deficit that the UK economy appears to be stuck 
with in the 1990s, along with a low level of 
confidence among those struggling to service their 
1980s debt overhang. 
Until the late 1980s most of the forecasting 
agencies employed a consumer spending model 
derived from the methodological approach of 
Davidson, Hendry, Srba and Yeo (1978), commonly 
denoted by the acronym DHSY. The core element 
of the DHSY approach is the idea that consumer 
spending behaviour is conducted with reference to 
a desired long-run (or steady state) proportional 
relationship between spending and income. In other 
words consumers (in aggregate) have some notion 
of a target average propensity to consume (or 
conversely an average rate of savings) and adjust 
spending patterns accordingly from one year to the 
next to maintain this target in the long run. The 
DHSY model implements this idea through a 
feedback mechanism (in the jargon an "error 
correction mechanism"), which means that if 
consumers in one year find themselves above their 
desired rate of saving they will allow the growth in 
their spending to ease off in the next. Conversely, 
if in one year they find themselves below the 
desired saving rate, they will allow spending growth 
to climb. Broadly speaking this representation of 
aggregate behaviour explains UK consumption data 
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with a high degree of explanatory power throughout 
the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and has proved to be 
a very successful empirical methodology for the 
study of economic time series data. High inflation 
rates in the 1970s present something of a problem 
in that it has been noted (Deaton 1977) that during 
high inflation consumers may, other things being 
equal, save more in order to compensate for real 
losses on nominally fixed holdings of liquid assets 
(for example Building Society deposits and Bank 
time deposits). This was a problem for the DHSY 
model when forecasting behaviour in the mid 1970s 
because high inflation was accompanied by negative 
real interest rates. It was dealt with by the explicitly 
inclusion of an inflation variable in the forecasting 
model (which correlates with the nominal interest 
rate through the Fisher effect). Subsequent work 
formalised the relationship between spending, 
income and assets by including a measure of the 
liquid asset holdings of the personal sector in the 
model and by positing that consumers have an 
additional target relationship between income and 
assets (Hendry and von Ungem-Sternberg (HUS), 
1981). By the mid 1980s the consumer spending 
equations of most of the forecasting agencies 
included a formulation along either DHSY or HUS 
lines. 
Figure 1 shows the forecast performance of a 
DHSY consumption function (estimated from 1972 
to 1986) over the two years 1987 and 1988. Figure 
2 shows the forecast performance of the same 
model from the beginning of 1989. The two figures 
together show a dramatic underforecast of consumer 
spending growth in the earlier boom period, and an 
appreciable overforecast of consumer spending 
growth as the current recession began to bite. HUS-
type models, which include consumer liquid assets 
as an additional explanatory variable, exhibit a 
similar, though less pronounced tendency to 
underforecast the boom and overpredict spending in 
the recession (Carruth and Henley 1990a). 
What was unusual about the mid 1980s spending 
boom was that, unlike in previous economic 
upswings (for example 1970 to 1973), the growth 
rate of spending consistently exceeded that of real 
disposable income, as illustrated in Figure 3. Table 
1 shows some regional variation in this pattern. In 
Scotland spending growth did no more than keep 
pace with income growth between 1981 and 1989. 
Past experience suggests that consumers allow their 
savings rate to rise during booms and fall during 
recessions - in other words consumption is 
smoother over the cycle than income. This stylized 
fact in essence justifies the feedback mechanism in 
the conventional forecasting models, but neglects 
forward looking behaviour on the part of consumers 
with respect to their "permanent" (lifetime) income. 
Clearly a situation in which consumer spending is 
accelerating away from income is unsustainable 
beyond a limited period of time. It can only be 
sustained to the extent that consumers are able to 
finance spending activity from other sources, 
principally from accumulated wealth. The 
unsustainability of consumer behaviour in the mid 
1980s in one sense made inevitable the collapse in 
spending confidence that has occurred since. 
Explanations for the spending boom 
The re-examination of the determinants of UK 
consumer spending which followed the discovery of 
the poor 1980s forecast performance produced 
several alternative, and not necessarily mutually 
exclusive explanations for this apparent change in 
behaviour. We can deal with some of the 
explanations rather more quickly than others. 
The explanation that most immediately springs to 
the mind of the sceptical observer is that the data 
had become unreliable, or more precisely that 
growing measurement error in the UK personal 
sector balance sheet was occurring during the 
1980s. If this was becoming manifest in an 
apparently plummeting savings rate, then it would 
tend to suggest that official statistics were under-
recording the income of the personal sector. 
Certainly the personal sector accounts, as well as a 
number of other important areas of the national 
accounts, among them the Balance of Payments 
account, did start to cause concern in the 
Government and reviews of procedure were 
initiated. To what extent personal disposable income 
is understated (or for that matter spending is over-
stated) is still unclear. 
Another early explanation that emerged concerned 
the shifting demographic structure of the UK 
population. Researchers at the London Business 
School (Currie, Holly and Scott, 1989) observed 
that the mid 1980s coincided with a sharp period of 
decline in the relative size of the 45 to 64 year age 
cohort of the British population. Since about 1960 
this cohort has been in long term relative decline 
but they noted a particular downward "blip" in the 
mid 1980s. According to life cycle theories 
consumers tend to dissave during the early part of 
their working lives (to finance house purchase, 
children etc.), save during "middle age", and 
dissave in retirement. Hence a reduction in the 
number of middle aged savers might induce a fall 
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in the aggregate savings rate. The blip in the size of 
this cohort corresponds to the sharp growth in 
consumer spending at the time - this 
correspondence is probably in good measure 
coincidental. The LBS work obtained a very 
sizeable coefficient on this cohort size when entered 
additively into their consumption function. The 
coefficient yielded an implausibly large effect on 
consumer spending from what was a relatively 
small demographic change (see Carruth and Henley, 
1990b, for further discussion). What is clear is that 
if demography has exerted an influence on 
aggregate spending patterns in the 1980s the effect 
is more complex, and probably operates in 
conjunction with other factors, and would require 
investigation with a microeconomic database. 
One attractive explanation for the spending boom, 
which is better grounded in the microeconomic 
theory of consumer behaviour, is that the 1980s 
witnessed an upward shift in the expected 
permanent or life cycle incomes of consumers (see 
King 1990). Consumers would have inferred this 
from higher current levels of disposable income. 
This would induce an immediate effect through 
higher spending. That effect might be quite 
pronounced if consumption is "excessively 
sensitive" to changes in current income (see Deaton, 
1992, for a more general discussion). It also 
suggests that a structural break in the consumption 
function occurred in the mid 1980s. The source of 
these enhanced expectations about future income 
levels may have been derived from a number of 
sources. Firstly, during the mid 1980s real earnings 
rose steadily by two percent per annum, and if 
consumers anticipated an extended period of 
sustained economic growth, then they may have 
expected that rate of real earnings growth was 
sustainable for some time to come. Secondly, 
Conservative Party manifesto commitments to make 
future tax cuts, believed because of the gradual and 
deliberate shift from direct to indirect taxation in 
the first two terms of Conservative government, 
may have contributed to expectations of higher 
future disposable income. Thirdly real gains on 
assets, including housing, privatization share offers, 
and, until 1987, on stock market investments, may 
have induced an upward shift in consumers' beliefs 
about their total lifetime resources. Evidence for a 
structural shift in lifetime income expectations is 
difficult to pin down, particularly from 
macroeconomic data. Recent work by Attanasio 
and Weber (1992), using 15 years of individual 
consumer data from the Family Expenditure Survey, 
is therefore of particular interest. Individual level 
data over a period of time allows the spending 
patterns of age cohorts of individuals to be traced 
through the 1980s boom. The authors find evidence 
for a substantial upward revision in permanent 
income in the 1980s, particularly among younger 
consumers. 
An explanatory factor that is frequently cited, 
particularly in the work of John Muellbauer and 
Anthony Murphy (1990), is financial deregulation. 
The key changes were the entry of the clearing 
banks into the mortgage market in the early 1980s 
and the 1986 Banking Act which allowed Building 
Societies to operate as banks. Rather than inducing 
an upward shift in perceived permanent income, 
financial deregulation operates to allow consumers 
greater flexibility in the intertemporal allocation of 
consumption. Easier access to credit, the increased 
"fungibility" of housing assets (which we shall 
discuss in greater detail shortly) etc. may have 
allowed consumers to bring forward spending plans 
than under a previous more strict financial regime 
which would have had to be postponed until current 
incomes or accumulated savings were higher. The 
importance of the housing market may have been 
critical here and we examine this in a separate 
section. 
The Housing Market and Consumer Spending 
The importance of the housing sector in the UK is 
linked to the strong growth in home ownership in 
the post-war period, largely because of substantial 
fiscal privilege in favour of those who own housing 
assets. Owner-occupation in Britain rose from 30 
percent of total housing tenure in 1950 to close to 
70 percent in 1990, although as Table 2 illustrates 
there is considerable regional variation in this rate. 
Householders in Scotland, for example, have never 
shown the same predisposition to owner-occupation 
as the English, and have levels of home ownership 
closer to those observed in other major developed 
economies. By 1990 the owner-occupied UK 
housing stock was worth at market prices almost 
£l,000bn, or nearly £18,000 per capita. Secured on 
this was a total mortgage debt of £290bn, or over 
£5000 per capita. The difference represents the 
personal sector equity stake in housing. Once again 
there is a very considerable regional variation in per 
capita levels of housing equity. Figure 3 shows that 
in 1989 on average in the South-East of England 
housing equity amounted to £12,500 in 1985 prices 
for every man, woman and child. In Scotland the 
same statistic is five times lower at around £2,500. 
An important question has been to isolate how this 
equity stake has been translated into spending. 
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One idea is that the relationship between consumer 
spending and the housing market comes about 
through the practice of Housing Equity Withdrawal 
(HEW for short, see Lee and Robinson, 1990). The 
most common example of this is the tendency of 
individuals, when they move, to increase their 
mortgages by more than the difference in price 
between their old house and their new house. In 
other words they take advantage of their house 
move to remove some part of the equity or value 
that they have accumulated in their existing 
property. In other words it is turnover activity in the 
housing market that can create the conditions for 
individuals to use their housing equity to "top-up" 
income and facilitate additional spending. They 
might want to do this for very good reasons. 
Moving house costs a lot of money, in estate 
agents' fees, solicitors' fees, survey fees, removal 
costs, and in stamp duty. In addition movers might 
wish to "overborrow" to finance improvements to 
their new property, such as refitting the kitchen; or 
they may simply take the opportunity to finance 
additional spending on consumer durables such as 
carpets or household appliances at mortgage rates of 
interest. This is attractive to households because 
mortgage rates, secured by a charge on the 
consumer's property are considerably below rates 
payable on bank overdrafts and credit card 
accounts, and attract a fiscal privilege through the 
operation of the MIR AS system. HEW may also 
result from final disposals of housing assets. Where 
a house sale is undertaken by the relatives of a 
recently deceased person, and those relatives 
already own housing property, then there is a good 
chance that a considerable proportion of the 
proceeds will be spent. This may be of growing 
importance since large numbers of existing owner-
occupiers are currently inheriting houses bought by 
their parents after the Second World War, and may 
be linked to the demographic effects discussed 
above. 
The measurement of equity withdrawal is 
complicated by equity injections by other 
participants in the housing markets - for example 
equity injections by first-time buyers or asset 
portfolio adjustments by existing owners. (Lee and 
Robinson, 1990, illustrate equity withdrawal in 
typical housing market transaction "chains"). Even 
though for every seller of a house there must be a 
buyer, the equity withdrawal effect need not net 
out. This is because the system of financing 
property purchase and credit creation means that an 
exogenous increase in personal sector wealth can be 
translated into higher spending financed through 
housing-secured borrowing. However, it must be 
noted that possibilities for equity withdrawal do not 
automatically presuppose dissaving, as investment 
in other financial assets may be part of the choice 
process. 
The net equity value of the housing stock in 1988 
was roughly £650bn. Now only a proportion of this 
stock is traded; about 15% at the peak of the 1980s 
housing boom. Therefore 15% of the £650bn of net 
housing equity gives a traded volume of equity of 
nearly £100bn. So households have the potential to 
withdraw some proportion of this £100bn to boost 
current incomes for spending purposes. Empirical 
estimates by the present authors (Carruth and 
Henley, 1990c) for the aggregate economy suggest 
that this withdrawal proportion rose to as high as 
12% in the housing boom of the 1980s. So in 1988 
12% of the value of £100bn worth of housing stock 
represents an equity withdrawal into incomes of 
£12bn. In 1988 UK consumer spending was 
growing at 7% per annum; and on these estimates 
equity withdrawal could have accounted for 50% of 
that growth rate. Regionally disaggregated estimates 
of HEW are more difficult to obtain because 
regional information on housing turnover is not 
available over any length of time. However, it 
seems certain that HEW will have been of very 
considerably less importance in Scotland because of 
the much lower rates of owner-occupation, lower 
rates of housing turnover and much lower 
appreciation in the value of housing in the 1980s. 
The Regional Dimension 
Given the rather different performance of the 
housing market in the 1980s across the UK, an 
interesting issue is to what extent the debate on 
aggregate consumer spending applies consistendy at 
the regional level. We have noted from Table 1 that 
consumer spending and income growth in Scotland 
behaved in a similar fashion, but much lower levels 
of housing equity in Scodand and the North would 
suggest that the relationship between the housing 
market and consumer spending might be rather 
different. More generally it seems likely that there 
are significant differences in consumer responses to 
income growth in different parts of the UK, given 
that the spending boom of the 1980s was more 
pronounced in the South East, East Anglia and the 
South West Holden and McGregor (1990) find 
significant differences between consumer behaviour 
in Scotland and the whole of the UK, in particular 
that in Scotland spending is more sensitive in the 
short-run to income changes, and that savings are 
more sensitive to the Deaton/Fisher inflation effect 
Recent work by the present authors (Carruth and 
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Henley, 1993) suggests that statistically significant 
differences in the structure of a DHSY-type 
consumption function are apparent across all 
regions of the UK. Not unexpectedly the evidence 
suggests that consumer spending has in the 1970s 
and 1980s been most significantly affected by short-
term movements in housing equity in the South 
East. The effects in most other regions, including 
Scotland, are modest or insignificant. Table 3 shows 
the annual growth rates of the gross real value of 
the housing stock and of real house prices. While 
real gains in the 1980s housing market in the 
South-East provided the perception of higher 
permanent income for the majority, in Scotland it 
seems likely that modest housing gains affected the 
spending patterns of only a few, with no significant 
influence in aggregate. 
Estimation of region by region consumption 
functions allows the calculation of the steady-state 
or target average propensity to consume (APC) for 
each region, discussed earlier. Our own estimates of 
these are shown in Figure 4. These show that there 
is a clear tendency for the steady-state APC in the 
1980s to be higher in the south of Britain. The 
South-East estimate implies an equilibrium savings 
rate of only one per cent, and underlines at the 
regional level the unprecedented excess of 
aggregate consumer spending growth over real 
income growth. This is strongly suggestive of the 
fact that it was in the south rather than in the north 
and Scotland where consumers revised upwards 
their perceived permanent income. 
Conclusion 
In the mid 1980s it is undoubtably the case that 
many households perceived a substantial revision in 
the level of their permanent income. Whether this 
arose because of an exceptionally buoyant housing 
market, initially in the South East of England, or 
whether the contributory factors are more varied, to 
do with the psychology of direct tax cuts and real 
earnings growth, is still a matter of debate. It is 
tempting to conclude that the North and Scotland 
were less fooled by an alleged "Thatcher miracle" 
than those in the South East. In addition financial 
deregulation relaxed liquidity constraints on many 
households, allowing life-cycle spending plans to be 
brought forward. For macro-modellers the 
experience resulted in considerable reassessment of 
the way in which the personal sector is modelled 
for forecasting purposes. The way forward seems to 
be one which, drawing on recent developments in 
particular in the American literature, models 
consumer spending as responding in a forward 
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looking way. Changes in consumer perceptions 
about the future and about the way that revised 
expectations about the future alter anticipations 
about life-cycle income will therefore affect present 
spending decisions. Life-cycle expectations about 
income depend on expectations about wealth as well 
as about future incomes. In this respect they are 
likely to vary considerably from region to region to 
the extent that assets holdings, particularly in 
housing, vary so much. In Scotland, where levels of 
owner-occupation are much lower and where the 
housing market is much less cyclically sensitive, the 
boom and bust of consumer spending in London 
and South East England must have been observed 
with considerable bemusement. 
The present slump in consumer spending in the 
South especially represents a "hangover" from the 
debt overhang created by the one-off impact of 
financial deregulation. It also reflects a considerable 
downward re-revision of expectations about 
permanent income, as consumers have caught on to 
the unsustainability of the 1980s-style promise of 
rising future disposable incomes in the context of 
1990s-style recession. After the "boom" and "bust" 
DHSY-type consumption models appear on casual 
observation to be back on track. What forecasters 
and modellers now know is that to be more 
confident of making accurate predictions about 
spending levels they need to take account of 
consumer behaviour in a much more sophisticated 
way. 
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Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rates of Consumption and Income 
% per annum 
Region 
North 
Yorks & Humbs. 
E. Midlands 
E. Anglia 
South East 
South West 
W. Midlands 
North West 
Wales 
Scodand 
N. Ireland 
C 
0.00 
2.08 
1.48 
1.18 
0.34 
2.44 
0.64 
0.17 
1.13 
0.99 
0.89 
1974-81 
Y 
0.53 
0.85 
1.90 
1.37 
0.35 
2.09 
-0.35 
0.06 
0.85 
1.23 
1.21 
C-Y 
0.53 
-1.23 
0.42 
0.19 
0.01 
-0.35 
-0.99 
-0.11 
-0.28 
0.24 
0.32 
C 
3.36 
4.25 
3.75 
5.81 
4.59 
5.14 
3.69 
3.78 
3.77 
3.48 
4.49 
1982-89 
Y 
2.75 
3.25 
3.73 
5.36 
4.05 
4.88 
3.72 
2.80 
3.34 
2.69 
4.46 
C-Y 
-0.61 
-1.00 
-0.02 
-0.45 
-0.54 
-0.26 
0.03 
-0.98 
-0.43 
-0.79 
-0.03 
C: real consumer spending 
Y: real personal disposable income 
C-Y: difference between average consumer spending growth and income growth 
Source: Regional Trends, regional price deflators obtained from Reward Group (1991) 
Table 2: Percentage Owner-Occupation by Region in 1989 
North 
Yorkshire & Humberside 
East Midlands 
East Anglia 
South East 
South West 
West Midlands 
North West 
Wales 
Scotland 
Northern Ireland 
UK Total 
Percentage 
59 
66 
70 
70 
69 
73 
67 
68 
71 
49 
64 
67 
Source: Regional Trends 
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Table 3: Average Annual Growth Rates of House Prices and Wealth by Region, 1982-89 
Region 
North 
Yorkshire & Humberside 
East Midlands 
East Anglia 
South East 
South West 
West Midlands 
North West 
Wales 
Scotfand 
Northern Ireland 
Real Gross Housing Wealth 
7.53 
7.50 
9.80 
11.53 
10.24 
10.23 
8.06 
6.04 
7.56 
4.54 
4.26 
Real House Prices 
4.09 
4.82 
6.55 
8.02 
7.38 
7.33 
5.36 
4.03 
4.64 
0.37 
0.71 
Source: Carruth and Henley (1993) 
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Figure 1. Forecast performance 
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